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ABSTRACT
Responses to the Great Recession are varied across welfare states
and gendered in their consequences. Combining gender, social
policy and social movement scholarship, this paper investigates
how the differential policy responses to the Financial Crisis in
three European countries shaped gender-differences in anti-
austerity demonstrations. We compare the involvement and char-
acteristics of women and men in anti-austerity protests using data
collected at street demonstrations (2010–2012). We conduct cross-
national multi-level analysis of demonstrators from countries repre-
senting different gender regimes (Spain, Sweden and the United
Kingdom). Our results show that gender regimes have a significant
impact on women’s and men’s involvement in anti-austerity pro-
tests. We thus make an important contribution to research on
gender differences in participation in anti-austerity demonstrations
post-Great Recession. Our comparison of women’s and men’s par-
ticipation in anti-austerity street demonstrations suggests that at
the country or regime level resources matter more than grievances,
but that grievances matter at the individual level. This innovative
paper links scholarship on gender regimes with research on protest
participation. Resources and experiences of grievances are shaped
by gender regimes which provide access to decision-making and
social support. We reveal novel insights into the connection
between gender regimes and demonstration participation.
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Introduction and overview
The financial crisis, which began in 2008 with the collapse of the US American Bank
Lehman Brothers, was at first labelled a ‘mansession’, initially affecting men working in
the private sector (Walby, 2015, p. 76). However, in the following years austerity
measures began to affect women more adversely than men, because women are dispro-
portionately employed in the public sector and are more likely to be public sector service
clients (Rubery & Rafferty, 2013). Governments’ responses, such as the adoption of
austerity measures and the (continued) erosion of welfare states, resulted in a political
crisis and caused a cycle of contention (Della Porta, 2015; Peterson, Wahlström, &
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Wennerhag, 2015). Anti-austerity activism includes multiple forms and claims and
represents some continuity with global justice movements (Della Porta, 2017a). It
encompasses industrial action, demonstrations of labour unions, the formation of radical
left parties and the collective occupation of public space (Hayes, 2017). Such anti-
austerity mobilisations address material issues as well as ‘the nature and meaning of
democracy’ and can therefore be understood as ‘pro-democracy movements’ (Flesher-
Fominaya, 2017, p. 14). However, the rise of populism is another response to austerity.
We only analyse anti-austerity movements from the left (cf. Della Porta, 2015) even
though we acknowledge that right-wing populist movements also represent a significant
response to neoliberalism and austerity (Roth, 2018). Although we lack data for compar-
ison, we suspect that the gender dynamics of anti-austerity movements from the left
differ from those of right-wing populist movements.
The ample research addressing protest participation in general and leftist anti-
austerity protests in particular (Della Porta, 2015; Flesher-Fominaya, 2017; Giugni &
Grasso, 2015a; Hayes, 2017; Peterson et al., 2015) has so far neglected gender differences
in these forms of collective action. Furthermore, the wealth of comparative social move-
ment research either neglects gender dimensions of contentious action (Kriesi,
Koopmans, Duyvendak, & Guigni, 1995; McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996; McAdam,
Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001) or is solely concerned with the strategies and success of women’s
movements (Banazak et. al., 2003; Beckwith, 2013; Katzenstein &McClurg Mueller, 1987;
Mazur, McBride, & Hoard, 2016). Women’s participation in protests outside of women’s
movements is yet under-researched and therefore our paper contributes to cutting edge
research on gender in social movements. Leftist anti-austerity mobilisation provides an
important opportunity to study the involvement of women in demonstrations. It is
established that there are marked differences in the proportion of women and men at
demonstrations across countries (Dodson, 2015). However, we still know very little about
what explains unequal demonstration participation of men and women in times of
austerity. Our paper closes this gap.
We compare the participation of men and women in leftist anti-austerity protests in
three countries, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom (UK), which have been
differently affected by and responded differently to the great recession. Moreover,
they represent different gender regimes (Walby, 2009), which should not be confused
with more narrowly conceived gendered welfare regimes1. In our cross-national study
of anti-austerity demonstrators in Spain, Sweden and the UK, we investigate whether
unequal gender participation of men and women in anti-austerity protests is best
explained by the gender regime (country) in which the demonstration took place, by
individual characteristics of demonstrators, or by both. We control for demonstration
effects to understand whether the non-random selection of demonstrations affects the
interpretation of the country-level (and regime level) effects. We explore this using data
from 16 anti-austerity demonstrations (see Table 1), extracted from the Caught in the
Act of Protest project database (Klandermans, Giugni, & Peterson et al., 2009), which
uniquely collected data at over ninety demonstrations in the period 2010–2012. We
selected all of the demonstrations against austerity that had been surveyed by the
project during that time period in the three countries we study. Previous analysis of
May Day and change demonstrations in this data-set confirmed that there has been
a ‘homogenising’ effect across so-called old and new movements (Eggert & Giugni,
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2012), which we see affirmed in the presence of universalistic goals of the demonstra-
tions we analyse (see Appendix 2).
We start out with an overview over the main explanations for women’s involvement in
anti-austerity protests. This section discusses gender regimes and our country cases, including
the extent and form of austerity measures, the general climate of anti-austerity mobilisation
and individual characteristics. We continue by describing our data and methods. Our results
show that gender regimes have a significant impact onwomen’s involvement in anti-austerity
protests. Our research thereforemakes an important contribution to the knowledge of gender
regimes and protest participation and how they are connected.
Austerity and resistance in UK, Spain and Sweden – main explanations to
women’s involvement in anti-austerity protests
Feminist scholars immediately pointed out that the financial crisis is gendered ‘in
terms of causes, impact and responses’ (Annesley & Scheele, 2011, p. 335). Some
argue that women’s under-representation in decision-making positions and mascu-
line norms in financial institutions contributed to irresponsible risk-taking (for
a critical assessment see Prügl, 2012). Women’s organizations have early on empha-
sized that the financial crisis significantly affects women (Pearson & Elson, 2015). In
September 2009, the European Women’s Lobby (EWL) the largest alliance of
women’s non-governmental organizations from twenty-seven EU member states
and three candidate countries highlighted that a gender perspective on the financial
crisis is crucial and warned that policy responses could result in an increased gender
gap. In this section we give an overview over explanations for women’s involvement
Table 1. Demonstrations surveyed and response rates.
Country and demonstration
Date of
demonstration
Questionnaires
handed out
Questionnaires
returned
%
response
rate
UK
May Day Labour March (London) 01/05/10 977 172 17.6
TUC’s March for the Alternative’ (London) 26/03/11 881 206 23.4
Occupy London (London) 12/11/11 910 141 15.5
Spain
Against the Europe of Capital, Crisis and War
(Barcelona)
28/01/10 210 76 36.2
Demonstration against the new labour law
(Santiago de Compostela)
30/06/10 504 166 32.9
Against Labor Law (Madrid) 29/09/10 733 301 41.1
Celebration May Day (Vigo) 01/05/11 154 66 42.9
1st May, Labour Day (Barcelona) 01/05/11 690 176 25.5
For employment, not capital reforms (Vigo) 01/05/11 340 168 49.4
Real Democracy Now! (Madrid) 15/05/11 778 350 45.0
Sweden
May 1 March, Left Party (Stockholm) 01/05/10 865 167 19.3
May 1 March, Social Democratic Party
(Stockholm)
01/05/10 826 175 21.2
May Day (Left Party) (Malmo) 01/05/11 374 140 37.4
May Day (SAP/LO) (Malmo) 01/05/11 287 95 33.1
May Day (Left Party) (Gothenburg) 01/05/12 458 209 45.6
May Day (Social Democratic Party/LO)
(Gothenburg)
01/05/12 423 159 37.6
SOCIAL MOVEMENT STUDIES 3
in anti-austerity protests. Drawing on Walby (2009, 2015) we first introduce the
concept of gender regimes, then we give an overview of austerity measures in the
three country cases and the protests against them, and lastly, we summarise indivi-
dual level factors explaining women’s involvement in anti-austerity protests.
Gender regimes
Gender regimes are highly complex and comprise multiple levels which include the overall
social system, the degree of gender inequality and a series of social practices. Indicators of
gender regimes comprise gendered inequality in the workplace, education, political participa-
tion, equality legislation, gendered civil liberties and childcare public expenditure (Walby,
2009, p. 303). Different policy domains may vary with respect to gender equality (Walby,
2009). ‘Domestic’ and ‘public’ gender regimes represent ideal types, though in reality gender
regimes of countries vary between these poles constituting a continuum (Walby, 2009). In
domestic gender regimes, women do the majority of unpaid care work, are underrepresented
in the paid labour force and politics, and have limited access to abortion. Although not equal
to men, women are significantly more involved in the public sphere (the labour market and
politics) in public gender regimes, where they also have easier access to abortion than women
in domestic gender regimes. Among public gender regimes,more social democratic andmore
neo-liberal gender regimes can be identified (Walby, 2015). Social democratic public gender
regimes are characterised by the provision of public services including childcare and employ-
ment regulations, whereas in neo-liberal public gender regimes themarket plays a central role
in the provision of services including childcare and the regulation of employment through
market mechanisms. However, over the last few decades, state support for child-care has
increased in different gender regimes including economies undergoing recession (Walby,
2009). ‘Themost important differences between the neoliberal and social democratic forms of
the public gender regime lie in the gendered depth of democracy and the degree of gender
inequality’ (Walby, 2015, p. 148). In contrast to the concept of gendered welfare regimes (see
endnote 1), the concept of gender regimes thus addresses public services, women’s employ-
ment, and women’s political involvement which is central for our analysis.
Our analysis includes one social democratic public gender regime and two neoliberal
public gender regimes. The UK represents a neo-liberal public gender regime, whereas
Sweden represents a social democratic gender regime due to the high integration of
women in politics and paid employment and the dual earner family model. Spain had
experienced a shift from a domestic to a social democratic public gender regime in the
early 2000s, however, austerity politics following the financial crisis transformed Spain
into a neoliberal public gender regime (Lombardo, 2017). Among the three countries,
Spain was hardest hit by the great recession, whereas Sweden was only moderately
affected and the UK less than Spain but more than Sweden. In summary, we select
these three countries for analysis because they represent different ideal-types of gender
regime: Sweden as social democratic, the UK and Spain both neo-liberal though varying
in their experience of the great recession and the policy responses to it.
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Gendered government responses to the great recession in comparative
perspective
Following the financial crisis, the EU and its member states adopted a ‘disciplinary
neoliberalism’ which combined deregulation and liberalization of the market, austerity
measures, fiscal and monetary policies, and a marginalisation of gender and other aspects
of social equality (Kantola & Lombardo, 2017). Even though the EU adopted gender
mainstreaming as a principle in 1997 and demanded from candidate states to adopt
gender equalities in order to be accepted as member states (Roth, 2008), gender was not
mainstreamed into crises measures (Gonzalez Gago, 2017). In fact, EU gender equality
policies were increasingly dismantled and gender equality-specific budgets were signifi-
cantly reduced (Jacquot, 2017). These shifts started prior to the financial crisis, but have
been intensified by the economic crisis (Jacquot, 2017; Kantola & Lombardo, 2017). The
increased marginalisation of actors and policies promoting gender equality in the EU
during the financial and political crises undermined efforts to address the gendered
impact of the responses to the crises (Weiner & MacRae, 2017).
Since the 1980s, neo-liberalism and associated welfare state retrenchment have
resulted in growing inequality. Workfare policies introduced by conservative as well as
by social democratic or centre left parties around the world led to stagnating and falling
wages and increasingly precarious working conditions. Not even Sweden, which has
traditionally been characterised by a generous welfare state has been spared from
neoliberalist policies accompanied by worsening working conditions, a rise in youth
unemployment, and urban segregation (Schierup and Alund, 2011; Schierup, Ålund, &
Neergaard, 2018; Therborn, 2018). However, despite the ubiquity of neoliberal policies,
governments responded differently to the great recession (Kiess, Norman, Temple, &
Uba, 2017).
Policy responses included support for the financial sector, stimulus packages and
public sector cuts. Farnsworth and Irving (2012) distinguish three responses: first,
economies most severely affected by debt-related crises in which public sector cuts
were inevitable (including Spain); second, economies which introduced austerity mea-
sures even though the economic conditions did not require public sector cuts (includ-
ing Sweden and the UK); and finally a group with fewer cuts (none of our study
countries). Responding to the great recession, in the UK public sector cuts considerably
exceed other ways to balance the budget (Farnsworth & Irving, 2012, p. 138). In
contrast Sweden reversed the introduction of neoliberal policies and returned to earlier,
generous policies (Kiess et al., 2017). Thus, rather than the depth of crisis the interac-
tion between the generosity of the welfare state and the government composition
explain the response to the economic crisis. More generous welfare states (such as
Sweden) are more likely to respond with counter-cyclical expansion of public spending,
whereas the degree of retrenchment or expansion varies in the less generous welfare
states due to the government (Starke, Kaasch, & Van Hooren, 2014). Retrenchment and
expansion are only two possibilities of welfare state transformation which also include
flexicurity, welfare adjustment and welfare protectionism (Haeusermann, 2012). New
social policies address ‘new social risks’ which tend to be concentrated among women,
the young and the low skilled (Bonoli, 2005). All these measures have gendered
consequences, which we now discuss.
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As noted above, Sweden, the UK and Spain responded differently to the crisis with the
most severe cuts in Spain and some extensions of social benefits in Sweden. Forced by the
EU, Spain made significant public sector cuts and deregulated the labour market which
increased women’s unemployment, worsened working conditions, and increased the
gender pay gap (Lombardo, 2017). The measures included downgrading gender equality
policies by eliminating the Equality Ministry, ceasing the implementation of the
Dependency Law in 2010 which supported women’s labour force participations by
providing financial support for day care work, cuts to children’s care facilities, and
postponing the extension of paternity leave (Gonzalez Gago, 2017). The Labor Market
Reform of 2012 which made it easier to fire permanent workers contributed to briefly
decreasing the gender employment gap by worsening men’s working conditions and
contributing to a temporarily slightly increased women’s employment rate as women
compensated for male un- and underemployment (Gonzalez Gago, 2017). By raising the
retirement age and the required years to access minimum as well as full pensions, the
pensions reform, which was passed in 2011, also had significant negative effects for
women who usually work fewer years due to care obligations (Gonzalez Gago, 2017).
The UK restricted poverty protection to the ‘poorest of the poor’ through cutting all
social benefits including those directed at low-income families. In June 2010, the newly
elected Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government announced its plan to close
the deficit within the following five years through a combination of 79% spending cuts
and 21% tax raises starting from 2009/2010 (Reed, 2017). The tax rises contributed to less
than 11% deficit reduction and changes to taxation even included a real-terms increase of
tax-free personal allowance, whereas child tax credits and working tax credits were cut.
The biggest losers of the public sector cuts were lone parents (90% women), working age
couples as well as single pensioners (75% women). Public sector cuts affected health care,
community funded social care, housing cuts, transport cuts, and cuts to higher and
further education. Reed (2017) estimates that women’s income cuts were twice as high as
men’s.
As noted above, although Sweden also experienced a gradual demise of the welfare
state (Schierup and Alund, 2011; Therborn, 2018), this was to some extent reversed
during the great recession (Kiess et al., 2017). In contrast to Spain and the UK, Sweden
engaged in a ‘stabilizing strategy’ and extended the amount and coverage of its social
benefit and increased the in-work tax credit to preserve a high level of consumption and
to prevent ‘traumatization’ and declining birth rates due to family and other social
benefits (Bothfeld & Rouault, 2015, p. 76). The impact of activation policies, which
seek to encourage paid employment by lone mothers, varies across welfare states.
Whether employment prevents poverty depends very much on the type of work that is
available. Short-hours part-time work typical for the UK may even increase poverty risks
especially if it is accompanied by a cut in benefits (Warren, 2015). In contrast, in Sweden,
the poverty risk of single mothers is much lower due to higher earnings and higher levels
of benefit entitlements in case of unemployment. However, even in Sweden, minimum
income benefits fell compared to median earnings (Jaehrling, Kalina, & Mesaros, 2015).
The commodification, corporatisation and marketisation of children and the elderly has
considerable consequences for care workers (predominantly women) as well as those in
need of care. For-profit care work tends to be ‘more codified, less personalized, poorly
paid, and less sensitive to the changing needs of the people to whom it is oriented’ (Farris
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& Marchetti, 2017, p. 126). Although a corporatisation of care work can be observed
across all Western countries, the extent varies significantly in Sweden and the UK, where
it is far more extensive and over 80% of elderly care is provided by for-profits. Sweden
introduced forms of care marketisation in the early 1990s, but at the end of the 2000s only
17% of elderly care and only 8% of child-care were provided by for-profits (Farris &
Marchetti, 2017, pp 119–120). Furthermore, the gender pay gap is much lower in Sweden
compared to the EU average. Nevertheless, in Sweden a gender pay gap of 8% can be
noted, Swedish women represent only 28% of all high-income earners, face striking
occupational segregation and have been strongly affected by public sector cuts
(Tsarouhas, 2011, p. 434). Thus, even if women have been hardest hit in Spain, to
a lesser extent in Britain and least in Sweden, in all three countries women have been
affected by public sector cuts.
How is the fact that the economic and political crises are gendered reflected in protests
in times of austerity? In the next section, we turn to anti-austerity protests in Europe.
Anti-austerity protests in comparative perspective
A wealth of scholarship has analysed anti-austerity protests responding to the financial,
economic and democratic crisis associated with the Great recession (for example Della
Porta, 2015; Giugni & Grasso, 2015a; Peterson et al., 2015). Like the Global Justice
Movement, contemporary anti-austerity movements comprise networks of groups and
organisations on the left including labour, alter-globalisation and women’s movements.
They include particularistic mobilisations organised by trade unions and addressing
particular material issues; and universalistic demonstrations including the occupations
of public space that take on broader grievances and bring together a diversity of actors
(Klandermans and van Stekelenburg, 2016; Sabucedo, Gómez-Román, Alzate, van
Stekelenburg, & Klandermans, 2017). However, as part of larger mobilisations against
neoliberalism and austerity, trade unions go beyond particularistic mobilisation and
other actors in making universalistic claims. In fact, Peterson, Wahlström, Wennerhag,
Christancho, and Sabucedo (2012) argue that far from being a ‘hollow ritual’, May Day
demonstrations in 2010 addressed grievances following rising unemployment thus
representing protest against austerity (see also, Appendix 2). Thus, trade union demon-
strations need to be included in analyses of anti-austerity protest in Europe (Peterson
et al., 2015).
Participants in anti-austerity protests include groups facing ‘new social risks’ (Bonoli,
2005) and ‘new losers’ of globalisation (Della Porta, 2015): young people who consider
their future as insecure; retired people facing pension reductions and cuts to much
needed social services; and public sector workers. As della Porta (2015, p. 65) writes
‘protesters do not belong only to a specific precarious class, but are rather moved by
a plural alliance of citizens whose existence is made less and less secure in neoliberalism’.
Della Porta (2015) does not consider gender, but as we explain above, women are
disproportionately insecure compared to men.
Research on recent anti-austerity protests has been carried out in many countries.
Such studies either lack cross-national comparison (Gerbaudo, 2017; Giugni & Grasso,
2015b; Ketelaars, Walgrave, & Wouters, 2017) or hardly address gender (Della Porta
et al., 2017; Flesher Fominaya, 2017) except as control variable. Thus, we make a valuable
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contribution to the literature by conducting a cross-national comparison, which also
considers women as a significant sub-group of ‘new social risk’ groups and ‘new losers’.
Only a few studies of contemporary protest focus on gender and feminist perspectives,
and gender differences in protest in particular (Roth & Saunders, 2019). Fuentes (2015)
notes that despite the conscious adoption of a non-hierarchical organisational structure
and distance from traditional political organisations such as political parties or trade
unions, initially feminist proposals did not make it on the agenda of the 15M movement.
Conflicts between the feminist committee and the rest of the movement lead to
a reactivation of feminism and eventually to a transformation of the 15M movement
(Fuentes, 2015, p. 363). In France and the UK, minority women felt ignored by the
‘raceless discussions of the white Left’ (Bassel & Emejulu, 2017, p. 99) and created DIY
activist spaces. While these studies provide important insights in women’s mobilisation
in times of austerity, what is lacking so far are systematic analyses of women’s involve-
ment in anti-austerity protests in comparative perspective.
Until recently, studies have found a male-biased gender gap in protest participation.
However, longitudinal evidence shows it is closing (Gallego, 2008). In 1974 60% fewer
women than men protested, but this had reduced to 13% in 2002 (Stolle & Hooghe, 2011).
By 2012, in Europe the most frequent protesters are actually more likely to be women than
men (Saunders & Shlomo, 2016). However, there is variation across demonstrations, varying
by issue (Gómez-Román & Sabucedo, 2014), and across countries: In May Day demonstra-
tions over 60% of the Swedish participants were women compared to less than 40% in Spain
and the UK (Peterson et al., 2012). We consider that it is particularly important to compare
men’s and women’s involvement in anti-austerity demonstrations for three reasons. First,
men and women have been differently affected by public sector cuts (Pearson & Elson,
2015). Second, austerity has led to a resurgence of feminism (Evans, 2015). Third, feminism
may play a factor in the revitalisation of the left (Maiguashca, Dean, &Keith, 2016). Before we
introduce data and methods, we briefly summarise individual level explanations for protest
participation.
Individual level explanations
Social and political contexts such as the financial crisis and public sector cuts shape
participation in demonstrations and reflect participation motivations (Peterson et al.,
2012). However, as we indicate above, with reference to the ‘new losers’ (Della Porta,
2015) who face ‘new social risks’ (Bonoli, 2005), broader social and political contexts
impact individuals. It is already well established that grievances, among other factors, can
explain preparedness for protest (Klandermans, van Stekelenburg, Damen, van Troost, &
van Leeuwen, 2014). Framed in this way, sufferance from new social risks can provide
people with the motivation to demonstrate in anti-austerity protests to protect their own
interests. It is certainly very clear that scholarship on anti-austerity protests has helped to
bring about a resurgence of grievance theories (Della Porta, 2015; Kern, Marien, &
Hooghe, 2015). Peterson, Wahlström, and Wennerhag (2018) additionally found that
women disproportionately self-identify as part of a discriminated category which might
also motivate them to participate in protests with marginalised and discriminated groups.
But there are also other factors that are known to support protest participation at the
individual level, which might compliment or counteract grievance theory. Biographical,
8 S. ROTH AND C. SAUNDERS
structural and psychological resources are known predictors of participation in demonstra-
tions (e.g. Dalton,1996; Schussman and Soule, 2005; Klandermans et al., 2014; Saunders,
2014). Biographical aspects concern age, employment and education which are related to
available time, monetary and knowledge resources (McAdam, 1986; Peterson et al., 2018).
Structural resources refer to being in the right place at the right time to hear about protest and
are therefore related to inclusion in physical or online networks. Psychological resources refer
to interest in politics, which is known to be a significant predictor for a variety of forms of
political participation (Dalton, 2005).
Hypotheses
Based on our review of the literature on gender regimes, differential effects of austerity
across countries and individual-level predictors of anti-austerity protest, we propose two
sets of hypotheses – at the country and individual level – to determine which combina-
tion of factors lead women to participate in anti-austerity protests. Since gender regimes
are ideal types, we operationalise different gender regimes by comparing countries.
Regime (country)-level
We purport that women in countries with policies and practices that support domestic,
political and social equality – such as a social democratic public gender regime like
Sweden – will be more likely to participate in anti-austerity demonstrations. This is
because they will feel more empowered as women are included in politics to a greater
extent and receive more state support compared to neoliberal public gender regimes such
as Spain and the UK. This leads to our first hypothesis:
H1: In a social democratic public gender regime (Sweden) we find a higher proportion women
in anti-austerity demonstrations compared to neoliberal gender regimes (Spain and the UK).
We also posit a contrasting hypothesis, which anticipates that it is not so much empow-
erment that determines whether women engage in anti-austerity demonstrations, but
rather it is the extent to which public sector cuts have been introduced in their countries.
Thus, we hypothesise:
H2: In countries with significant public sector cuts (UK and Spain) we find a higher
proportion women in anti-austerity demonstrations compared to a country which has
reversed public sector cuts (Sweden).
Individual-level
At the individual-level, we hypothesise that biographical, structural and psychological
factors predict women’s participation in demonstrations regardless of the gender regime.
This leads to hypothesis three:
H3: Female anti-austerity demonstrators have more biographical, structural and psycho-
logical resources for protest than male anti-austerity protesters.
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However, anti-austerity demonstrators are likely to be different from protesters in
general. They are known to consist of the ‘new social risk’ groups (Bonoli, 2005) and ‘new
losers’ (Della Porta, 2015). Given that public sector cuts affect women more adversely
than men, they are more likely to be motivated to participate in protest to protect their
own interests. We include this as a separate hypothesis because social movement scholars
have, since the late 1970s, had a tendency to favour theories of agency (H3) to grievance
theory (H4) until a recent resurgence of the latter in relation to anti-austerity protest.
Thus, we expect to find, at the individual-level that:
H4. Female demonstrators are more likely than male demonstrators to be motivated to
participate in anti-austerity demonstrations to protect their own interests.
Finally, merging country- and individual-level expectations, we anticipate that self-interested
motivations are more strongly held by women demonstrators most adversely affected by cuts
(Spain and the UK) compared to those in Sweden, who are less adversely affected.
H5. Women compared to men in neoliberal gender regimes such (Spain and the UK) will
have stronger motivations to participate in demonstrations for self-interest than women
compared to men in a social-democratic gender regime (Sweden).
Data and methods
We analyse data from 2,765 demonstrators at sixteen anti-austerity demonstrations that
took place in the UK, Spain and Sweden, 2010–2012 (see Table 1 for a list of demonstra-
tions). Our selection of these demonstrations was determined by the available data.
However, there are also good theoretical reasons to choose protest events in these years.
As discussed above, during this time-period, unemployment rose significantly, the UK and
Spain announced and started to implement austerity cuts, whereas Sweden reversed some
of its neoliberal policies. Of course, some austerity measures were implemented later and it
would be very welcome to replicate our study with more recent protest data.
We use a mixed effect logistic regression model, in STATA, to discern which factors –
country (regime) or individual level variables – predict whether a demonstrator is
a woman. We nest the individual level data within the sixteen demonstrations, to allow
us to make comments about the conditioning effects of the specific demonstrations
surveyed. The multi-level model is important because a) we do not have
a representative sample of anti-austerity demonstrations in each country and b) there
are, indeed, significant demonstration effects. The Swedish demonstrations, for example,
are all organised by trade unions and parties. Due to space constraints, we focus our
analysis on the country (regime) and individual levels and pay less attention to demon-
stration effects, which, as we show in our analysis, are cancelled out by country (regime)
level effects.
The selection of demonstrations by national protest surveying teams was beyond our
control. Given the impossibility to retrospectively select a representative sample of
demonstrations in each country, we additionally repeated our analysis using the
European Social Survey (ESS, Waves 5 and 7, 2010 and 2012, n = 1178), with design
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weights applied. It is important to note, however, that the ESS sample does not disag-
gregate demonstrators by protest issue and it therefore includes data on demonstrations
in times of austerity rather than those that are specifically anti-austerity. However, we do
know, based on protest event analysis data from the POLCON (Political Conflict in
Europe in the Shadow of the Great Recession) project (2019) that between 2008–15,
18.5% of Swedish demonstrations reported in the media had an economic claim to public
institutions, compared to 25.3% in the UK and 27.1% in Spain. We bear these figures in
mind in our interpretation of the ESS data and our comparisons with protest survey data.
The protest survey data
The protest survey data were collected using Caught in the Act of Protest project protest
survey methodology. This involves state-of-the-art techniques for random selection of
demonstrators and for assessing response rate bias. The surveying technique requires
around 1,000 demonstrators to be present at a demonstration. The team aimed to
distribute up to 1,000 mail-back questionnaires at each demonstration using a ‘pointer’
or team leader to randomly select respondents (Walgrave & Verhulst, 2011). One-fifth of
these questionnaires was accompanied by a short matched numbered face-to-face inter-
view. Since refusal rates for the interview are usually low (c.10%), it is possible to gain an
impression of the types of people that do and do not respond to the mail-back ques-
tionnaire by comparing the two sub-samples.
The response rates of the protest surveys we analysed range from 15.5% (Occupy
London) through to 49.5% (For Employment Not Capital Reforms, Vigo) (Table 1). This
makes it essential to test the representativeness of the data. We used statistical tests to
compare face-to-face with mail-back-data to understand the extent of non-response bias.
We tested for significant differences in the aggregated responses to questions that are
repeated in both versions of the questionnaire.We used Fisher’s Exact to compare the mail-
back and face-to-face samples for the binary variable (e.g. man or woman), Kendall’s tau-b
for ordinal variables (when a firm decision was made, education, previous participation in
demonstrations [ever]), and t-tests for interval data (age, satisfaction with democracy,
political interest and membership in organisations that staged the demonstration).
There are some small but statistically significant differences between the two sub-
samples (mail-back compared to face-to-face). Women are slightly more likely than men
to complete the mail-back survey (42.7% of face-to-face respondents were female,
compared to 46.4% of mail-back respondents).2 The mean age for those interviewed
was 41.0 years, compared to 44.7 for those returning the mail-back survey.3 Satisfaction
with democracy is 0.54 higher, on average, for mail-back respondents (mean = 4.42)
compared to face-to-face ones (mean = 3.87).4 The average number of organisational
memberships in both samples is almost identical (0.52 for face-to-face, 0.53 for inter-
viewed), as is the average degree of political interest (3.35 for interviews, 3.34 for postal
surveys). Those returning questionnaires in the post had committed themselves to
attending the demonstration earlier: 55.5% of mail-back respondents decided to attend
over a month ago, compared to 49.7% of those interviewed.5 Mail-back survey respon-
dents are more highly educated (64.6% claim to have a university education, compared
54.5% of interviewees)6 and more likely to have previously participated in protests. Only
2.6% of mail-back respondents were complete novices, compared to 5.5% of
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interviewees.7 These differences are consistent with other protest surveys (Walgrave,
Wouters, & Ketelaars, 2016) and express the need for slight caution in the interpretation
of the results. Women are slightly over-represented, even though they remain in fewer
numbers to men at most demonstrations that were surveyed.
Choice of variables
Our dependent variable is whether the demonstrator is male or female. Individual level
variables measure biographical, structural and psychological resources required for participa-
tion in protest and include age, employment, education, political interest, political participa-
tion, individual efficacy and instrumentalmotivation. Finally, we add left-right self-placement
(LRSP) as a control variable, given that the demonstrations we survey are left-wing.
Results
Our descriptive analysis shows the proportion of men and women at each of the 16
demonstrations, the aggregated totals across the three countries, and the ESS results
(Table 2). The proportion of anti-austerity women demonstrators is highest in Sweden
(53.2%) and lowest in Spain (43.1%). The UK is similar to Spain, at 46.4%. It is important
to note, also, that there is some variation in the proportion of women demonstrators within
countries. In theUK it varies from 32.5% forOccupy through to 51% for the TUC’sMarch for
the Alternative. In Spain, the proportion of women at demonstrations surveyed ranges from
31.5% forAgainst the Europe of Capital, Crisis andWar through to 52.3% for Real Democracy
Now!Although the proportion of women at demonstrations in Sweden is markedly higher, it
Table 2. Demonstrations included in the analysis and proportion of women.
Country and demonstration n % sample % women
UK
TUC’s March for the Alternative’ (London) 199 7.45 51.01
Occupy London (London) 137 5.10 39.42
May Day Labour March (London) 167 6.22 32.53
UK total 502 18.77 46.37
ESS 138 N/A 49.28
Spain
Against Labor Law (Madrid) 300 10.89 44.67
Against the Europe of Capital, Crisis and War (Barcelona) 76 2.75 31.58
Celebration May Day (Vigo) 66 2.39 44.67
1st May, Labour Day (Barcelona) 176 13.51 31.82
Demonstration against the new labour law (Santiago de Compostela) 166 6.00 43.98
For employment, not capital reforms (Vigo) 166 6.08 37.95
Real Democracy Now! (Madrid) 344 12.66 52.33
Spain total 1294 47.12 43.12
ESS 832 N/A 48.6
Sweden
May 1 March, Left Party (Stockholm) 164 6.04 60.40
May 1 March, Social Democratic Party (Stockholm) 173 6.33 48.60
May Day (Left Party) (Malmo) 140 5.06 50.00
May Day (SAP/LO) (Malmo) 95 3.44 44.21
May Day (Left Party) (Gothenburg) 208 7.56 57.70
May Day (Social Democratic Party/LO) (Gothenburg) 154 5.68 53.25
Sweden total 934 34.10 53.21
ESS 208 N/A 54.33
For the ESS, the data is weighted (pweight*dweight) as per the ESS weighting guide.
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also varies. 44.2% of survey respondents were women at the May Day (SAP/LO) demonstra-
tion inMalmo, compared to 60.4% at theMayDay Left Party event in Stockholm.Overall, the
aggregated percentages of women demonstrators per country are broadly comparable to the
ESS data – highest in Sweden (54.3%) and similar for the UK (49.3%) and Spain (48.6%).
However, it is important to remember that the ESS data aggregates data across demonstrations
on a range of issues.
In Table 3, we present our mixed effects regression model results. Model 1 shows
a null model for demonstration effects. It finds that there are significant differences in the
proportion of women at demonstrations across the 16 demonstrations in the sample.
However, this effect is cancelled out when, in Model 2, we add the fixed effect of country.
This, along with our descriptive statistics presented above, indicates to us that we can be
fairly certain to have found country-level effects, despite the non-random sample of
demonstrations analysed within each country and some intra-country variation. The
positive and significant co-efficient in Model 2 for ‘Sweden’ indicates that anti-austerity
demonstrations in Sweden have a higher proportion of female demonstrators compared
to the UK and Spain. In Model 3, we add the individual level variables. We find that
‘Sweden’ continues to be a significant predictor even when we add a host of individual
level variables. Although not significant, the co-efficient for Sweden is positive also in the
ESS, which aggregates demonstrating on any issue (ESS model in Table 2). Thus, women
are more likely to demonstrate in Sweden regardless of the demonstration issue, which
provides further support for H1 (gender regime effects) rather than H2 (extent of cuts).
This is especially noteworthy given that Sweden has the lowest proportion of anti-
austerity demonstrations in each of our study countries (18.5%, compared to 25.3% in
the UK and 27.1% in Spain, POLCON 2019).
Our results also indicate that women anti-austerity demonstrators are more precar-
ious: they tend to be younger and to not work full-time. They are more highly educated
than their male counterparts, more likely to vote in a general election, to be asked by
someone else to attend, to have a sense that their political participation can make
a difference and to be left-wing. However, they state that they are less interested in
politics than men, except for in the ESS data-set, where they are more interested. The
contrary ESS data is likely an artefact of the manner in which the ESS aggregates
demonstrations on different issues. We posit that demonstrations on issues that do not
involve protecting one’s self-interest are more likely to require political interest. Women
demonstrators’ relative lack of political interest might be compensated for by the fact that
they are more likely to participate in anti-austerity demonstrations to protect their own
interests compared to male demonstrators.
In the final model, Model 4, we include an interaction term between protesting
for self-interest and country to test H5. Although the interaction term is not
significant, it is important to note that it cancels out the positive significant
coefficients for both country (Sweden) and self-interest as a motivation. This
suggests that motivation to protest to protect self-interest is differentially distrib-
uted across the three countries. Indeed, in Spain, 59% of women demonstrators
claim that they are very much motivated by self-interest, compared to 53% of men.
In the UK, the proportion of men and women demonstrators who participate in
an anti-austerity demonstration to protect their own interests is almost the same
(32% for women, 30% for men). In Sweden, slightly more men than women
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demonstrate to protect their own interests (23% women, 25% for men). The mean
score for ‘motivated to participate to protect own interests’ for women anti-
austerity protesters in Spain is 4.5 (on a five-point scale, where 5 = very much),
compared to 3.9 in the UK and 3.5 in Sweden. The mean scores for male
demonstrators are 4.3 for Spain, 3.8 for UK and 3.4 for Sweden.
Discussion
Our results at the country-level appear to support the gender regime/empowerment
hypothesis (H1), rather than the differential effects of public sector cuts hypothesis
(H2). The gender regime/empowerment hypothesis (H1) suggested that:In a social
democratic gender regime (Sweden) we find a higher proportion women in anti-
austerity demonstrations compared to neoliberal gender regimes (Spain and the UK).
The highest proportion of women in anti-austerity protests was found in Sweden,
a social democratic public gender regime, which had the highest proportion of women
in employment of our three country cases (75%), the highest proportion of female MPs
of our three countries. H2, the differential effects of public sector cuts hypothesis led us
to anticipate higher numbers of women protesters on anti-austerity protests in the
neoliberal public gender regimes UK and Spain compared to elsewhere. However, to
the contrary, we found that Sweden, which was less affected by public sector cuts
compared to Spain and the UK, still had the highest number of women demonstrators.
Spain had the lowest proportion of women demonstrators. In 2010, of our three
countries the employment rate of women was lowest in Spain (at only 56.3%), but
the unemployment rates for men (19.6%) and women (20.2%) in Spain hardly differed
(Eurostat, 2010). Although public sector cuts were, arguably, most damaging to women
in Spain, the proportion of women turning out to anti-austerity demonstrations was
the lowest there.
At the individual level, biographic availability seems important in determining the
gender of anti-austerity protesters (H3). Women demonstrators were younger than their
male counterparts and less likely to be in full time employment. This suggests that they
may have had more time resources, but that they may also have been in part-time or
precarious employment and thus were adversely affected by public sector cuts. They were
also better educated than men and therefore we might say that they had greater knowl-
edge resources. They claimed to be less politically interested than men, while at the same
time they were more politically active in national elections and rate themselves as more
left-wing on the left-right-self-placement scale. It might be that they perceived them-
selves to be less politically interested than they really are. Indeed, they had – compared to
men – a relatively high sense that their individual actions would make a difference to
public policy. Their relative lack of full-time work may suggest that they constitute a new
wave of women’s activism, demonstrating mobilisation of those affected by ‘new social
risks’ (Bonoli, 2005), supporting the notion that women are a substantial part of the ‘new
losers’ of globalisation (Della Porta, 2015).
The notion that women protested because they belong to the ‘new social risk’ groups
and ‘new losers’ is further supported by our finding that demonstrating to protect self-
interests (H4) is a significant predictor of women’s participation in anti-austerity demon-
strations. This is particularly the case for Spain, where nearly all women on anti-austerity
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protests claimed to ‘very strongly’ agree with the statement that ‘I participated in the
demonstration in order to . . . defend my interests’. We find no support for H5 that
country and self-interested motivations interact to predict participation of women. Self-
interest is similar for men and women in each of the countries, even though it is
differentially distributed across countries when men and women protesters are
aggregated.
Our analysis shows that there are important differences in the extent of women’s
participation in anti-austerity demonstrations within countries as much as across them.
However, the demonstration level effects disappear as soon as we add ‘country’ (regime)
to the models. This indicates that the type of public gender regime – social democratic or
neo-liberal – and the extent of cuts matter. Nonetheless, it is worth mentioning that the
calls for action of demonstrations may attract or repel women. The May 1 March, Left
Party march in Stockholm, for example, explicitly included challenging patriarchy in its
call for action and managed to attract demonstrators comprised approximately (given
response rate bias) 59% of women. The Demonstration Against the Europe of Capital,
Crisis and War in Barcelona which attracted proportionately fewer women was, in
contrast, predominantly about work in a male dominated employment sector. Spain
has historically had one of the lowest labour force participation rates for women in
Europe (Lombardo, 2017). This suggests that country-level variables, gendered cultures
of protest and demonstration contexts interact to determine whether women turn up to
demonstrations.
A good turnout of women used to be rare in many trade union/political party
organised demonstrations generally (Walgrave, Wouters, Van Laer, Verhulst, &
Ketelaars, 2012) and in our sample, except for in Sweden. Indeed, female demonstrators
were more likely to lack organisational embeddedness (Klandermans et al., 2014) and
were more likely to protest alone (Wahlström and Wennerhag, 2014). Our results
contrast with previous findings. The London-based Trade Union Congress organised
demonstration returned the highest rates of participation from women of the three UK
demonstrations analysed. This reflects the fact that women represent a growing propor-
tion of the unionised workforce in the UK due to structural transformation and the
unionisation of the public sector. At the same time, some Occupy camps have been
characterised by ‘gendered hierarchies, hostility to feminism and sexual violence’ (Eschle,
2018, p. 534) which might explain the lower involvement of women in Occupy compared
to the TUC demonstration.
Moreover, these are not the only forms of anti-austerity protests. Public sector cuts
have coincided with a resurgence of feminism (Evans, 2015). In the UK, the Women’s
Budget Group analysed the gendered impact of the government budget and spending
review in various reports. In November 2011, the Fawcett Society organised
a demonstration against austerity measures, warning that they might reverse gender
equality and ‘turn back time’ in the UK. Furthermore, austerity measures have under-
mined as well as inspired minority women’s activism and protest in the UK (Bassel &
Emejulu, 2017), including the formation of new organisations such as Sisters Uncut
(Ishkanian and Saavedra, 2019). In Spain, women have been involved in anti-austerity
protests in a range of contexts and organisations including political parties, trade unions,
feminist organisations as well as the 15M or Indignados and the 22M or March for
dignity (Lombardo, 2017; Palomo, 2016). Whereas women represent less than half of the
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participants in anti-austerity protests in the UK and Spain, their participation remains
significant (over 40%). In Sweden, women represent more than half of the participants in
anti-austerity protests. These differences might be related to variations in European’s
women’s movements (Roth, 2017). Whereas in Sweden women are more fully integrated
in traditional political institutions, historically the women’s movements in Spain and the
UK are more independent from the state. Thus, in addition to participating in mixed-sex
anti-austerity protests, women in Spain and the UK mobilise separately (Evans, 2015;
Fuentes, 2015). On 8 March 2018, the Spanish feminist movement organised a 24-hour
labour, education, care and consumption women’s strike (Campillo, 2019).
Conclusion
Our analysis makes an important contribution to research on gender differences in anti-
austerity demonstration participation post-Great Recession specifically and to the under-
standing of women in protests other than the women’s movement. Furthermore, our paper is
innovative in that it links scholarship on gender regimes and social policy with research on
protest participation. Resources and experiences of grievances are shaped by gender regimes
which provide access to decision-making and social support.We found that the proportion of
female demonstrators was highest in Sweden, the country with most equal gender regime. It
was lowest in Spain, the country hardest hit by the Great recession and austerity measures.
Access to resources and entitlements – as experienced by women in Sweden – encourages
women’s participation in anti-austerity demonstrations and defending their gains. In contrast,
Spanish women are faced with the double burden of employment in precarious working
conditions and the responsibility for reproductive labour (Lombardo, 2017). In addition, they
participate in feminist protests (Fuentes, 2015). Perhaps it is unsurprising, therefore, that
Spanish women are most likely to demonstrate to protect their own interests. In the UK, the
Great recession has been instrumentalised to justify public sector cuts, but unemployment is
lower than in Spain. In the UK, men’s unemployment rate was higher than women’s and
women’s political participation lower than in Sweden and Spainwhich appears to be linked to
the lower participation of women in demonstrations. Our comparison of women’s andmen’s
participation in anti-austerity street demonstrations suggests that at the country level
resources and thus gender regimes positively predict, and the extent of cuts negatively
predicts, women’s participation in anti-austerity demonstrations. At the individual level,
grievances positively predict women’s participation. Based on our analysis, we conclude
that gender regimes matter with respect to demonstration participation of women and
men. In addition to mixed-sex organizations, feminist mobilisation also needs to be taken
into consideration when studying anti-austerity protests. Future analyses of cross-national
protest survey data should consider the impact of the implementation of austerity measures
from 2012 onwards. In addition, we call for cross-national comparisons of gender differences
in involvement in right-wing populist anti-austerity movements.
Notes
1. We distinguish gender regimes from gendered welfare regimes. We are aware of Esping-
Andersen’s (1990) typology of three welfare regimes (conservative, liberal, social-democratic
welfare states) which, due to its male bias, has been criticised by feminist scholars (e.g. Leitner,
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2003; Lewis, 1992; Sainsbury, 1996) who developed scholarship on gendered welfare states.
The inclusion of Mediterranean and Eastern European welfare states and the transformations
of European welfare states in the past thirty years, not to mention the emergence of welfare
states around the world, have challenged Esping-Andersen’s typology (for a review see Arts &
Gelissen, 2010), though the existence of the three ideal types of welfare states has – so far –
been confirmed (Ferragina & Seeleib-Kaiser, 2011).
2. Fishers exact = 0.02.
3. T-Test t=−7.82*** (significant at the 99.9% level, equal variances assumed).
4. T-Test t=−6.16*** (significant at the 99.9% level, equal variances assumed).
5. Chi Square 28.2*** (significant at the 99.9% level with 3 degrees of freedom).
6. Kendall’s tau-b 0.13*** (significant at the 99.9% level).
7. Kendall’s tau-b 0.09*** (significant at the 99.9% level).
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